Chapter 4: National Security and Intelligence Activities
Responding to international critical incidents
Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada

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Responding to international critical incidents

165. One of the Department's key national security activities is leading the coordination of the government's response to international critical incidents. The Department defines critical incidents as "unforeseen security incidents which may pose a significant risk to the safety of a Canadian citizen and may impact Canada's broader national security interests." Footnote 383 Critical incidents could have national security implications based on the identity of the attackers or hostage-takers (e.g., terrorist group), the motives of the attack or the objectives sought (e.g., financial gain or policy concessions), and the identity of the victim (e.g., a government employee or a Canadian internationally protected person). Footnote 384 The vast majority of international critical incidents are hostage-takings by terrorist entities.

166. The Department's responses to hostage-takings abroad differs significantly from that of kidnappings. Footnote 385 For crime-related kidnappings, GAC's Consular Operations manage cases with local police, who are primarily responsible for investigating and resolving the incident. Footnote 386 For hostage-takings by terrorist entities, the Department's Task Force on International Critical Incidents (FCID) is responsible for coordinating the government's response. In these cases, military, police and intelligence organizations work together toward the safe release and return of the hostages.

167. The following section looks at GAC's role in the broader government response to hostage-takings by terrorist entities. The section examines the Department's authority to respond to international critical incidents, efforts to develop a policy framework to guide the government's response, and GAC's responsibilities in this area. The section concludes with two case studies exploring the practical application of GAC's role in the government's response to two recent hostage-takings of Canadians in *** in 2016 and in the Sahel region in 2018.

Authorities

168. The Minister's authority to lead the coordination of the government's response to international critical incidents derives from the Crown prerogative, which includes the mandate of the Minister to conduct all diplomatic and consular affairs on behalf of Canada. Footnote 387 This authority extends to the broader provision of emergency assistance to Canadians abroad, including repatriation, evacuation and humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters, pandemics or terrorist attacks. Footnote 388 Canada's International Emergency Response Framework describes GAC's two core responsibilities in responding to emergencies abroad, namely to monitor international events to identify potential or immediate threats to Canadians or Canadian interests, and to lead the coordination of the response by mobilizing relevant capabilities from across the government by creating an interdepartmental task force. Footnote 389 The Framework is considered in more depth at paragraph 175.

The government's strategic approach to terrorist hostage-takings

169. Over the last 20 years, the Department has attempted to develop a policy framewo rk to manage international terrorist hostage-takings. These policies sought to establish a governance framework outlining the government's objectives and principles while clarifying the roles and responsibilities of implicated federal organizations. Despite these efforts, no formal policy has ever been adopted. That said, implicated departments use elements of the proposed framework to determine whether an abduction constitutes a critical incident requiring an interdepartmental approach. The Prime Minister has also publicly declared the government's position and principles: Canada will make no ransom payments for Canadian citizens taken hostage by terrorist organizations. Footnote 390 As part of the approach, GAC has generally conducted retrospective analyses of the effectiveness of the response through various lessons learned exercises.

Attempts at developing a policy framework

Initial policy drafts

170. The Department's efforts to develop a formal critical incident policy framework began in the mid-2000s following a November 2005 terrorist kidnapping incident in Iraq. Between 2006 and 2009, the Department developed draft policy frameworks to establish the broad objectives, principles and organization-specific activities to guide the government's response to terrorist hostage-takings. The first iteration in 2006 sought to establish the following objectives:

  • to achieve the early and safe release of the kidnapped victim(s);
  • to facilitate the prosecution of the kidnappers; and
  • to respond to incidents of international terrorist kidnappings in a manner that seeks to
  • prevent or mitigate further kidnappings. Footnote 391

171. The draft policy framework also defined the government's key response principles. The most notable was that the government would make no substantive concessions to kidnappers, including that the government would make no major policy changes, would not exchange prisoners for victims, would not allow immunity from prosecution, and would not facilitate or make a ransom payment. The 2006 draft stated that GAC would be the lead federal department to coordinate and facilitate the response, proposed the creation of an interdepartmental task force, and outlined preliminary response procedures for the key security and intelligence organizations contributing to the proposed task force. Footnote 392 In support of this draft policy, GAC started to define its own role and responsibilities through the establishment of internal procedures in 2007. The 2006 policy was not finalized and GAC's 2007 procedures were not completed.

172. In 2009, the Department updated the draft policy. The new draft reiterated the 2006 objectives and further defined a number of key aspects of a potential governance framework. From a strategic and governance perspective, the draft policy established the roles and responsibilities of senior officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the deputy heads from the RCMP, CSIS, the CAF and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and GAC's heads of mission. The GAC Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for International Security (or a senior member from GAC appointed by the Deputy Minister) was to be the chair of the interdepartmental task force and this forum would serve as the principal body for determining the implementation of the policy and response of the government in a specific case. From an operational perspective, the document presented specific roles and responsibilities for incident management (e.g., *** ). Footnote 393

173. The 2009 draft policy identified a number of factors to consider when determining whether to invoke the policy. Factors weighing in favour of invoking the policy included that the victim was a Canadian citizen and that the possible or presumed identity of the kidnapper may have links to a terrorist group. Factors weighing against invoking the policy included whether the incident was motivated primarily by financial considerations, the location of the incident (particularly if a GAC travel advisory was in place), ***. The draft policy stated that decision-makers would need to make a contextual assessment in each case to determine applicability. Footnote 394

174. The 2009 draft emphasized that the no concessions principle would guide officials, and provided direction in the event that a third party engaged in paying a ransom ***. Footnote 395 Similar to the 2006 draft, this policy was not formally approved, but departments did use it in subsequent years as a basis for its response to international terrorist hostage-takings.

Contemporary policy initiatives

175. In December 2016, the government published the International Emergency Response Framework. The Framework provides a general integrated approach for GAC to lead an "all hazards" response to emergencies abroad (e.g., natural disasters, intentional or accidental human-induced catastrophe such as terrorism or a technological incident). Footnote 396 The Framework also formalized the Interdepartmental Task Force (the Task Force) to facilitate coordination of operations, information sharing, development of policy recommendations, and decision-making for emergency response. It provides functional groupings for various roles, responsibilities and activities that may be required in response to an emergency, such as diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, communications, intelligence and security assistance, and logistics. It also directs GAC to coordinate information sharing through standardized situation reports shared with relevant government partners.

176. In 2018, the Department sought to refine the Task Force's specific terms of reference and policy framework for responding to terrorist hostage-takings. GAC's January 2019 draft terms of reference for the Task Force sought to establish the criteria to invoke the use of the coordination mechanism. Footnote 397 It reiterated the 2006 and 2009 draft principles for the government's response - *** Footnote 398

177. The 2019 draft policy framework for critical incidents described key strategic and operational functions for the Task Force and participating organizations. From a strategic management perspective, it outlined that the Task Force would make a recommendation to deputy ministers to set the broad parameters of the government's response on receiving notification of a known or suspected critical incident. In setting the strategic direction, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, as the official responsible for coordinating the national security and intelligence community, could consult deputy ministers prior to engaging the Prime Minister and recommending a meeting of the Incident Response Group, a dedicated emergency committee chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by relevant ministers and officials depending on the circumstances.

178. From an operational perspective, the draft critical incident policy framework identified the Task Force's participating organizations and a series of non-exhaustive actions or functions these departments should consider following the invoking of the framework (e.g., ***). Footnote 399 The draft framework prescribed specific roles and functions for the FCID coordinator, who chairs the Task Force under the direction of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Task Force Chair convenes and coordinates the activities of the Task Force, including by establishing priorities, coordinating taskings, producing situation reports, and hosting meetings to facilitate deconfliction between partners, among other activities. Footnote 400 In practice, the Task Force adopted a tiered structure, including a working level, ADM level and deputy minister level, with each level convened on an as needed basis.

179. The government did not formally adopt the policy in 2019, similar to 2009. Departmental resources to advance this draft policy were diverted to respond to the hostage-taking of Edith Blais in late 2018, though government officials stated that the draft approach served as the basis for their response.

Key lessons learned from previous critical incidents

180. The government typically prepares after action reports following the conclusion of a case. The Department provided all of the reports for national security-related hostage-takings that were prepared from 2010 to 2021. Though these lessons learned exercises varied in scope and methodology, they generally identified best practices and concerns or issues with the approach. These exercises identified both strategic and operational considerations, but the Committee focused primarily on issues regarding the strategic management of cases, policy considerations, and GAC's roles and responsibilities in interdepa·rtmental coordination.

2009: The Coulter report

181. In 2009, the Department and PCO commissioned former Chief of CSE Keith Coulter to assess the government's response to the terrorist hostage-taking ***. Footnote 401 The report made findings and recommendations in a number of areas, including prioritizing the government's level of effort, strategic decision-making, coordination and leadership.

182. First, on prioritizing and determining the government's level of effort, the Coulter report stated that organizations involved in this incident generated an unprecedented response in scale and activities for a terrorist hostage-taking, and that this was the appropriate level of effort. Organizations made the determination of effort themselves. Best practices identified in this report included ***, the establishment of the interdepartmental committee process, the development of a strong intelligence-driven response, and the successful leveraging of diplomatic engagement. However, the report also noted that there was no strategic decision to determine the level of priority nor to assess the government's national security interests. It noted that this gap in prioritization and decision-making would be critical for future incidents to determine the level of effort or priorities:

The reality, of course, is that not all kidnapping cases abroad can be treated the same. While the value of human life is equal in each case, there are clear differences in terms of the broader interests at stake, including national security and foreign policy interests. ... We need to be able to make distinctions and take tough decisions , and our national security interests need to be the critical driver in determining the priority. Footnote 402

183. Second, the report stated that when there is tension between the "no concessions and no ransom policy" and potential options to ensure the safe return of hostages , the government must be prepared to make a clear decision on another option that does not involve concessions or the payment of ransoms. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an instance where the government declined to make a decision. *** ] Ultimately, the report made three recommendations to address these issues:

  • Canada should maintain its declaratory no ransom/no concessions policy and continue to place pressure on states where kidnappings occur to find solutions.
  • When placing pressure on states results in clear tensions with the no ransom/no concessions policy, PCO and GAC should work together to ensure that the options and implications are fully addressed, as appropriate, for decision-making by deputy ministers, ministers and the Prime Minister.
  • *** PCO and GAC should work to ensure that a comprehensive follow-up action plan is approved by the government with clear objectives, deliverables, timelines and accountabilities. Footnote 403

184. Third, the report noted that gaps in senior-level direction and decision-making challenged the coordination and management of interdepartmental activities of the Task Force. For example, the report noted that the lack of consensus at the Task Force regarding rescue operations polarized the position of some participating departments while leaving others to take decisions on their own. Similarly, the report noted that the RCMP's emphasis on the criminal investigation impeded the activities of other organizations from pursuing activities within their own mandates focused on the safe return of the hostages. The lack of agree ment and coordination on these issues, and gaps in leadership at the Task Force prevented senior decision-makers from prioritizing certain activities or options. Footnote 404

185. Fourth, the report found that the interdepartmental task force formula was well established and generally worked well. However, it found that deputy ministers did not play a strong management role in providing strategic guidance to set the parameters of the government's response. This had the corresponding effect of leaving the operational level with no sense of the parameters for managing the case. At the same time, the operational level and the Task Force did not seek further strategic guidance from deputy ministers, resulting in a general lack of clarity of what might constrain the government's position or inform its activities in response to the incident. Footnote 405

186. In summary, the report found that that the government needed to enhance its strategic- level management of the incident. This is relevant for decisions regarding the policy positions of the government, to determine its level of effort, and the prioritization of operational activities. The report also found that establishing leadership within the Task Force is necessary, as this would facilitate greater clarity in the strategic and operational management of the response. Footnote 406 The government responded to a portion of these issues by formalizing permanent capacity within GAC to lead and coordinate the Task Force through the establishment of FCID.

2005-2009 lessons learned

187. The Department provided the Committee with an overview note summarizing key lessons learned from four separate hostage-takings between 2005 and 2009 and a separate lessons learned document for a 2008 incident. While the documents do not describe the methodology or the participants, the documents highlight a series of recurring issues.

188. In assessing the strategic considerations of an incident in 2005, the Department highlighted that the absence of written policy limited the government's response insofar as there was no clearly delineated direction to participating departments. Footnote 407 Following a 2008 critical incident, GAC identified a need to develop formal protocols and standard operating procedures for officials to quickly build knowledge and understanding of how the government responds to hostage-takings. Footnote 408 It also emphasized the importance of establishing a policy framework to set the parameters of the response and to determine the government's level of effort, stating that "deciding which cases to engage in or to what degree the group needs to engage was also noted as a critical issue requiring policy guidance: defining where those cases sit in terms of national interest is important." Footnote 409 Similar to other cases, the absence of a formal framework or a prioritization scheme generated recurring questions for decision-makers at the outset of an incident.

189. In 2009, the Department conducted a lessons learned exercise that echoed the findings of the Coulter report insofar as no permanent capacity existed in any federal department or agency to respond to international hostage-takings. Departments and agencies coordinated efforts through an ad hoc interdepartmental committee mechanism, but no central entity existed to formalize policies or to retain knowledge and expertise. This gap in standing capacity was highlighted by the Department in response to the *** hostage-taking. Similar to the Coulter report's finding, GAC identified the need for standing internal capacity to establish and maintain an appropriate framework to manage complex consular cases. Footnote 410

2014: Critical incident in ***

190. Following the resolution of a critical incident *** in 2014, GAC submitted an open-ended questionnaire to Task Force members asking for recommendations to inform the development of formal policy. Respondents stated that the government's approach was still constrained by the absence of formal policy to inform strategic decision-making. For example, Task Force organizations identified the need for senior decision-makers to reconcile potential differences or contradictions between the Government of Canada's policy positions (i.e., no ransom/no concession) with a host nation's right to manage an incident. Footnote 411

191. Task Force participants also identified a need to develop a contemporary and concise document defining the roles and responsibilities of each participating department to alleviate any confusion or concerns at the outset of an incident. Participants noted that the absence of formal policy also played a role in delaying the sharing of information and intelligence, and recommended that clear guidelines be established to manage the flow of information. Footnote 412

2017: Policy workshops

192. In 2017, GAC and PCO organized a series of workshops in response to direction from deputy ministers to prepare a policy paper to assess key strategic questions on the government's response to hostage-takings. While the draft policy was developed for deputy ministers, the Committee was informed by GAC that the document was not releasable to the Committee as it was deemed a Cabinet confidence in its entirety. The workshop included Task Force participating organizations and considered four broad issues: policy and practice; governance framework; military support; and family engagement, media and communications. For the purposes of this review, the Committee conside red the key policy and governance issues from these workshops.

193. Workshop participants again identified the need for clear strategic guidance in managing an incident. Footnote 413 They raised the *** system as a potential model; wherein the *** convenes a meeting at the outset of an incident to facilitate the provision of "clear intent and authorities going forward." Footnote 414 Similarly, participants reiterated that the lack of a clear policy framework creates challenges in how departments respond to and prioritize incidents. Footnote 415 More pointedly, they noted that deputy ministers need to decide ***. Footnote 416 The workshop participants emphasized that the government's policies, roles and responsibilities, and decisions in managing an incident must be clearly articulated and reasonable to avoid claims of negligence and legal liability. Footnote 417

GAC's operational role in responding to international critical incidents

194. Prior to 2009, the Department's operational management of international critical incidents was ad hoc, with no permanent unit responsible for addressing cases as they arose. Following a string of critical incidents from 2005 to 2008 and the Coulter report in 2009, the Department established FCID as a permanent unit to support the operational management of these cases. The unit was initially under the responsibility of the Department's Consular, Security and Emergency Management Branch, but was moved to the International Security and Political Affairs Branch's Intelligence Bureau in 2010 because of the intelligence-led nature of these cases. Footnote 418

195. FCID's core responsibility is to serve as the secretariat for the Task Force. This unit has three full-time employees: a coordinator, a deputy coordinator and a family response officer. Footnote 419 In close cooperation with the Department's Emergency Watch and Response Centre, FCID provides 24/7 response service for new incidents, notifies members of the Task Force of a potential critical incident and convenes a meeting of the Task Force to coordinate a response. Footnote 420 Once the Task Force determines that a case constitutes an international critical incident, FCID coordinator chairs the Task Force and the Joint Intelligence Group; Footnote 421 coordinates the Task Force's activities; provides logistical support to the Task Force, including the dissemination of situation reports to Task Force members; manages family relations in cooperation with the RCMP; and serves as the central focal point for liaison with missions ***. Footnote 422 FCID is also responsible for preparing and facilitating the reception and repatriation of hostages upon their release.

196. Beyond its activities in response to critical incidents, FCID is also responsible for developing policies, procedures and training materials in support of the government's response to such incidents. Footnote 423 FCID has produced a number of internal procedures to guide the Department's initial response to an incident, including guidance on notification protocols for the Department's Emergency Watch and Response Centre, guidance to missions for terrorist hostage-takings, and a series of questions and considerations for the first 24 to 48 hours of a case. Footnote 424 The unit has recently developed draft documents outlining the Department's communications approach and media strategy for critical incidents, and templates for officials responsible for engaging with victims' families. Footnote 425 In terms of training materials, FCID provided the Committee with recent documentation on planned hostage recovery and victim support training programs. Footnote 426

197. Although FCID has existed since 2009, it seems to have been primarily focused on managing critical incidents themselves rather than preparing for them. It produced draft documents relating to the Department's internal processes and responsibilities only between 2018 and 2021. The unit's limited resources and the need to focus on case management left important policy gaps. It has not addressed its broader role of government coordination, producing no documents to coordinate or assist other government departments. In the area of training, the Department's internal documents account for the participation of other departments and agencies participating in the Task Force, but no training was scheduled for Task Force members scheduled prior to 2021 and FCID has not facilitated routine tabletop simulation exercises with Task Force members in preparation for future cases. Footnote 427

198. In sum, several key themes consistently emerge from government lessons learned reports and exercises: the need for a clear policy on the government's response to terrorist hostage-takings, the importance of leadership and clear decision-making throughout an incident, and the need for clarity on roles and responsibilities. The Committee will examine the practical application of the government's response framework through two recent case studies.

International critical incidents case studies

199. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. Four sentences were deleted. They described the basis upon which the Committee chose the case studies, and similarities and differences between them. ***] The Committee decided to examine two case studies (the abduction of Edith Blais in the Sahel in 2018 and the abduction of *** in *** in 2016) where Canadian citizens were taken hostage and the events were declared critical incidents. It did so to better understand an activity where the Department states that it has a clear leadership role, and where it is responsible for coordinating the activities of other security and intelligence organizations implicated in the government's response. The Committee found that the cases had important differences and similarities, and, in some circumstances, reinforced findings from government studies of previous incidents. Both cases occurred in high-risk regions where the government had travel advisories in place, and where the host government had limited capacity to address the incidents. Footnote 428

200. The Committee did not request information held by all departments on these incidents. Rather, it primarily focused on material received from the Department. The Committee therefore focused the majority of its assessment on the role that GAC plays in these incidents. However, the Committee cannot ignore other issues that came to its attention through the course of its review. In the absence of conducting a review of the entire government framework for responding to terrorist hostage-takings, the Committee limited its assessment to the role and activities of the Department and issues which significantly affect it.

201. The Committee recognizes that terrorist hostage-takings are difficult to resolve. They involve a number of domestic and foreign individuals, groups, partners and allies, some of whom have motives that are unknown, malign or, at the very least, different from Canada's. Government officials working for the hostage's safe return do so under stressful circumstances where information is limited and the stakes are high ***. The Committee also recognizes the painful experiences of the families whose loved ones are taken hostage, often for long periods of time and sometimes with tragic outcomes. It is for these reasons that the Committee believes the government must have a clear, principled approach to such incidents.

202. The Committee notes a number of concerns regarding the documentary record provided by GAC. The Department provided a number of documents for these case studies, the overwhelming majority of which consisted of emailed situation reports and a handful of joint briefing notes for deputy ministers. The Committee found clear gaps in information where it would othe rwise expect a documentary record (for example, for the resolution of cases). Moreover, it did not receive any documents prepared by the Department for the Minister of Foreign Affairs (the Department noted that officials commonly provide oral briefings to the Minister and their staff; nonetheless, the Committee would expect the department to retain preparatory material used in such briefings). For the Committee, these gaps reveal concerning lapses in the Department's information management and retention practices, which in turn have significant implications for the Department's governance and accountability for these incidents.

Case study: *** 2016 (***)

203. On *** 2016, Canadian *** arrived in *** on behalf of his Montreal-based employer to work on a *** project ***. On ***, *** and two *** co-workers were abducted at gunpoint. Footnote 429 In a matter of hours, GAC was advised of the hostage-taking. Initial information suggested that a local criminal gang perpetrated the incident rather than a terrorist entity. This is a critical distinction: criminal kidnappings are managed by GAC's Consular, Security and Emergency Management Branch; terrorist hostage-takings are deemed a national security incident and man aged by the separate FCID structure. FCID convened the first working-level Task Force meeting on *** and identified the case as a critical incident. Footnote 430 The RCMP notified the family and in the following days contacted *** employer. Footnote 431

204. The working-level Task Force undertook a number of preliminary steps to collect more information. Footnote 432 These included:

  • confirming *** was a Canadian citizen (some reports suggested he had Canadian and *** citizenship), as this would inform the government's interest in the case;
  • identifying the captors (Le., criminals or terrorists), as this would inform the government's approach; and
  • understanding the Government of *** expected level of engagement, as this would inform the government's potential deployment of resources and level of effort. Footnote 433

As part of these efforts, GAC initiated diplomatic engagement through its missions in *** and Tunis. Footnote 434 For its part, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada confirmed on *** that *** was a Canadian citizen. With respect to the identity of the captors, information highlighted that the location of the abduction was a known terrorist transit way between *** and Algeria. Footnote 435

205. On ***, GAC convened the first meeting of the ADM-level Task Force to consider operating assumptions and establish the government's preliminary approach to the incident. Briefing material for this meeting acknowledged that the difficult security situation in *** would limit the government's response options ***. The ADMs were also advised of *** different response mechanisms and rules of engagement for these types of incidents ***. During this meeting, GAC-stated that ***. Footnote 436 ADMs noted that experience also supported such an approach, as establishing a parallel line of effort could potentially jeopardize negotiations with captors. Footnote 437 GAC officials consulted the Department of Justice and were satisfied that this approach would be consistent with the Department's consular obligations. Footnote 438

206. The ADM-level Task Force also considered departmental roles and responsibilities during this meeting. ***. GAC would "convene the [Task Force] and coordinate the Government of Canada's response, including diplomatic engagement and operational support from missions." Footnote 439 ADMs also considered key messages for use with ***, notably that all three hostages should be treated as a group. Footnote 440

207. The government would continually emphasize that Canada wanted the victims treated as a group throughout the incident. During a call with the *** ambassador, GAC's ADM utilized these key messages and emphasized the importance of treating the victims as a group. Footnote 441 FCID reiterated to the mission in *** that general interactions with the *** government should convey this type of messaging while also noting that "we would not want the Canadian hostage to be left behind." Footnote 442 ***. Footnote 443 In the following days, *** responded that the victims would be treated as a group if they remained a group, but that this could change should the captors separate the victims. Footnote 444 While there were important strategic considerations in keeping the hostages together, notably to limit the number of potential communications channels with the captors, which could have raised potential demands, the Committee notes that Canada ***.

208. Over the next two weeks, there were no significant updates or changes in the case. FCID convened a number of working-level Task Force meetings, distributed regular situation reports to Task Force members and worked with the RCMP to engage *** family.

209. The Committee received limited information regarding the roles played by ministers throughout the incident. The Minister of Foreign Affairs held a call with *** family and informed them that the Prime Minister would be informed of any developments. Footnote 445 Following this call, the Minister's office sought additional information from the working-level Task Force ***. Footnote 446 Footnote 447 The Committee is not entitled to receive information that is Cabinet Confidence. However, in the records provided, it did not see indication of senior-level, strategic direction to the Task Force that would suggest that a ministerial or Cabinet-level meeting was convened as part of this case.

210. On ***, the working-level Task Force convened a Joint Intelligence Group meeting to review the case. The Group concluded that the gove rnment had not collected enough intelligence to make a proper assessment of the identity of the captors, but that involvement of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb could not be ruled out. Footnote 448 The following day, FCID convened the second ADM-level Task Force meeting. Officials considered a number of issues, including the absence of sufficient information to identify the captors or the location of the victims. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences descri bed government considerations. ***]

211. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations, including that the case met the criteria for a critical incident "given the significant risk that a terrorist group may be involved in the hostage taking." ***] Footnote 449 Footnote 450 Footnote 451

212. On ***, the Deputy Minister of GAC provided a status update to the *** Committee (which is separate from the deputy minister-level Task Force), [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations. ***]. Footnote 452 Footnote 453 Footnote 454 Footnote 455

213. Following this *** meeting, the working-level Task Force further refined options for government action. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations. ***]. Footnote 456

214. During the second deputy minister-level Task Force meeting on ***, the Deputy Minister of GAC provided a significant update on the case. The Deputy Minister noted that Canada's Ambassador to *** was notified on *** of the existence of two videos of the victims, and that the captors were a group of criminals threatening to transfer the hostages to Daesh if their demands were not met. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations. ***]. Footnote 457

215. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations. ***]. Footnote 458

216. These options ultimately proved unnecessary. On ***, officials were informed that *** and the two *** nationals had been released following 47 days in captivity. *** was flown to ***, provided consular s upport and returned to Canada on ***. The Department has no documents that addressed the resolution of the incident, but a document prepared in the context of a separate case ***. Footnote 459

Lessons learned

217. On ***, FCID organized a working-level Task Force lessons learned exercise to examine the government's management of this in cident. On the issue of decision-making and guidance from senior officials, departmental representatives generally shared the view that "the lack of clear direction from ADM- and OM-level meetings hampered the Task Force's ability to manage the case and align resources effectively." Footnote 460 The group recommended that FCID develop a template for seeking decisions from deputy minister-level and ADM-level meetings. On the issue of situation reports and general reporting, participants agreed that each organization needed to tailor briefing materials for their respective mandates and priorities, but that FCID needed to "develop a more robust template for [situation reports] to ensure all aspects of a critical in cident are covered." Footnote 461 No similar lessons learned exercise was conducted at the ADM-or deputy minister-level.

Case study: Sahel 2018-2020 (Edith Blais)

218. On December 17, 2018, Canadian Edith Blais and Italian *** were taken hostage in Burkina Faso while transiting from Italy to Togo by car. On December 31, *** mother reported the pair as missing to the Canadian mission in Rome. GAC initially treated the case as a missing person, but FCID convened a working-level Task Force meeting on January 5, 2019, and declared the case a critical incident due to the location, pattern of hostage-takings in the region and length of silence from the victims, a decision later endorsed by the Deputy Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Footnote 462

219. Based on the records provided, the Committee saw no indication that the Department was implementing strategic direction to frame the scope of the government's response at the beginning of this case. In response to Committee questions, the Department stated, "there are no records of any role played by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the outset of this case," but that the "Minister and her office maintained situational awareness on the case." Footnote 463 In mid January 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Ms. Blais' family ***. Footnote 464 In late January, the Prime Minister's Office requested a briefing for the Prime Minister in the days following a TVA report on the hostage-taking, Footnote 465 and he was briefed again in February. Footnote 466

220. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privi leged information. The paragraph described government actions, including that the RCMP initiated a criminal investigation. ***] Footnote 467 Footnote 468 Footnote 469 Footnote 470 Footnote 471

221. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government actions, and noted that the Committee saw no indication that the Task Force conducted a whole-of-government assessment of the best way forward, coordinated the approach or defined the government's overall level of effort, issues which had been identified in previous lessons-learned exercises. ***]. Footnote 472 Footnote 473

222. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government actions, and noted a minor incident which highlighted gaps in central leadership, decision-making and coordination that would continue throughout the case. ***]. Footnote 474 Footnote 475 Footnote 476

223. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government actions. ***]. Footnote 477 Footnote 478 Footnote 479

224. At the end of January and in early February, officials prepared possible options and resolution scenarios. The working-level Task Force decided that no resolution option should be discounted, while noting that it would be difficult to plan and approve a hostage rescue operation without a higher degree of confidence in the location of the victims and the captor group. Footnote 480 GAC and DND/CAF officials agreed that a formal request for assistance from the Deputy Minister of GAC to the Chief of the Defence Staff would ***. Footnote 481 ***.

225. On February 8, deputy ministers held their first meeting and received a joint briefing on the case. [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. It discussed government deliberations. ***]. Footnote 482 The joint briefing also recommended that the working-level Task Force simultaneously explore all options to resolve the incident. The briefing highlighted the following considerations:

In the absence of a formalized hostage taking policy, the GoC's [Government of Canada] response and pursuit of its objectives in resolving a hostage-taking incident is framed by a set of no ransom/no concessions principles. GoC's primary objective in all hostage cases is preservation of life, and early and safe release of hostages, with investigation of the crime being a secondary objective. ... In multi-national hostage takings, best practice of our [Five Eyes] partners and historical GoC practice has been to ***. Footnote 483

Similar to the previous case study and the lessons learned portion of this chapter, the government was again faced with the question of managing its stated no ransom or concessions principles with the objective of a safe return of the victim.

226. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government considerations of courses of action, including a hostage rescue operation. ***]. Footnote 484 Footnote 485

227. On April 11, 2019, Deputy ministers of the implicated Task Force organizations held a meeting to discuss the incident and to provide strategic direction. First, deputy ministers charged the working-level Task Force with developing a range of scenarios, ***. The Task Force was to determine required authorities, risks and resource needs for each option and scenario. Deputy ministers raised the importance of briefing ministers on the case so that they may make decisions on short notice. GAC's summary of the meeting also noted *** an issue to be raised to Ministers. Footnote 486

228. On May 6, GAC's newly appointed Deputy Minister proposed holding a deputy minister-level meeting. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described decisions by Deputy Ministers in June to direct the Task Force to prepare a briefing for ministers and to maintain the government's current level of effort. All materials related to preparing this briefing and its content were redacted or withheld for reasons of Cabinet confidence. ***]. Footnote 487 Footnote 488 Footnote 489

229. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] By mid-June, the Task Force decided to prioritize the planning of a hostage rescue mission. During a deputy ministers meeting, the Chief of the Defence Staff noted that the government must determine the process for documenting the Prime Minister's decision regarding this operation, with the Task Force recommending that the mechanism be "light" given that it was a precedent-setting decision. Footnote 490 Footnote 491 Footnote 492 Footnote 493

230. Over the course of the following months, the viability of a rescue option steadily diminished. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described challenges. ***]. Footnote 494 Footnote 495 Footnote 496 Footnote 497

231. Deputy ministers met regularly in early August. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government deliberations. ***] Footnote 498 Footnote 499

233. In mid-September, a federal election was called and the government entered the caretaker convention. Footnote 500 [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government deliberations. ***]. Footnote 501 Footnote 502 Footnote 503

233. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Following the federal election, deputy ministers met before a new Cabinet had been appointed. Their discussions focused on a number of issues, and they agreed to separately brief their ministers prior to a joint briefing in early 2020. Footnote 504 Footnote 505

234. In mid-January 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Mali. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described government deliberations. ***]. Footnote 506

235. Resolution of the case would come over the span of three weeks. [*** Five sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. They described government actions. ***]. Footnote 507 Footnote 508 On March 13, the UN notified the Canadian Embassy to Mali that Ms. Blais and *** were at a UN base in northern Mali following 452 days in captivity. Thereafter, Ms. Blais was transported to a U.S. military medical facility in Germany and returned to Canada; *** was repatriated to Italy. Footnote 509

Challenges

236. It is inevitable that a Task Force composed of multiple departments and charged with addressing a critical incident over unknown and often lengthy periods will experience challenges. A few are notable.

  • The RCMP provided inconsistent support to the Task Force at the beginning of the incident. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. It described how the inconsistent support affected the Task Force. *** ]. Footnote 510
  • Information sharing was problematic, particularly at the beginning. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. It described specific instances of problems with information sharing. *** ]. Footnote 511
  • There were gaps in governance and a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. It described specific instances of gaps in governance and lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities. *** ]. Footnote 512

Lessons learned

237. Two meetings were held in June to discuss the conclusion of the case. [*** The rest of this paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. It described specific working-level discussions. *** ]. Footnote 513 Footnote 514

238. Deputy ministers also met to discuss the incident. Among the key issues identified, deputy ministers were briefed that:

  • the absence of any formal policy and governance framework had a negative impact on efficient interdepartmental coordination at all levels;
  • the government's approach was ad hoc and not institutionalized;
  • there were challenges in determining the level of effort and consistency in prioritization of resources across organizations;
  • the case was labour-intensive and the government lacked appropriate funding mechanisms, challenges that were exacerbated by limited human resources expertise.

Deputy ministers agreed to contract an independent review of the government's response to this case and the case of ***, who was taken hostage on January 15, 2019, in Burkina Faso and was murdered by his hostage-takers two days later. Footnote 515 This review would consider the policy and governance framework, ***, key partner engagement, family and victim support, media engagement, and overall sustainability from a financial and human resources perspective. Footnote 516

239. The Committee received a draft of this independent assessment in July 2021. Prepared by a former Director of CSIS and Deputy Minister of National Defence, the report echoes a number of findings from previous lessons learned exercises (see paragraphs 92-103), notably:

  • the current governance structure is "ineffective;"
  • there was no decision regarding the level of effort for the government's response to the hostage-taking, leaving individual departments to determine their response;
  • ministerial direction is necessary regarding Canada's hostage policy, ***; and, implicated organizations must agree on roles and responsibilities. Footnote 517

The Committee considers the broader implications of the case studies along with the issues identified in the preceding section in the following Committee's Assessment.

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