Chapter 5: Observations on NSICOP's Inaugural Year and Looking Forward
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2018

261. NSICOP’s inaugural year was marked by learning and adjustment for the Committee, its Secretariat and the security and intelligence community.

262. Members of the security and intelligence community provided support to the Committee throughout its first year. The Communications Security Establishment and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service used their long experience working with review bodies to help other organizations prepare for Committee reviews. Community officials were generous with their time and readily shared their experience with the Committee. Their support for NSICOP’s mandate was repeatedly expressed during site visits, briefings and Committee hearings. A number of organizations also identified specific personnel or established dedicated units to respond to heightened expectations of review {the Department of National Defence was notable in this regard), which will be important should Bill C-59 receive Royal Assent and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency be established in the future. For its part, the Privy Council Office supported the Committee and its Secretariat to put in place the administrative, physical and information infrastructure required to conduct their work. It has taken a coordination and liaison role on behalf of the community, leading the coordination of the community's briefings to the Committee and responding to its requests for information.

263. The Committee's timelines imposed pressures on the security and intelligence community. The Committee did not start meeting until December 2017, and did not have a fully staffed Secretariat until August 2018. Before it could determine which reviews it would conduct in its first year, the Committee had to learn about the many organizations involved in the complex fields of security and intelligence. As discussed in Chapter 1, it conducted a number of site visits to the core organizations of the security and intelligence community and was briefed on the national security threats and challenges facing Canada. In April 2018, it deliberated on the range of reviews it could conduct and chose two, described in this report. It also agreed to conduct a special review of the various allegations surrounding the Prime Minister's trip to India in February 2018. In each case, the Committee imposed tight timelines on the departments and agencies to provide information and hold hearings to ensure the Committee could provide the Prime Minister with its Special Report and Annual Report, consistent with the requirements of the NSICOP Act.

264. The Committee recognizes that these were not ideal circumstances. In the future, the Committee intends to take a more measured approach to its reviews. Without compromising its independence or the ambition of its work, the Committee will endeavor to engage community members earlier to better define the scope of reviews and determine the information that will be required; to set reasonable deadlines for the provision of documents, working level engagement and to prepare for Committee hearings; and to work earlier with officials to determine the scope of changes required of Committee reports to protect information that should not be publicly disclosed. These steps will not always be possible in every circumstance - as the Committee learned early in its mandate, a special report may come up unexpectedly and require an accelerated timetable or unique information requirements. But where the steps are possible, the Committee believes they will help to strengthen its reviews.

265. At the same time, the Committee notes a number of challenges which it will monitor over time. One challenge relates to the provision of information. Despite unambiguous and, the Committee believes, sincere expressions of support from the leaders of the security and intelligence community for the mandate of NSICOP, several organizations interpreted Committee requests for information narrowly. The Committee had to return repeatedly to organizations to obtain more information, including relevant email correspondence, to ensure that what was provided was complete, and to engage officials for answers to basic questions.

266. The Committee would be remiss not to comment on its own challenges. Most sadly, the Committee lost one of its own, Member of Parliament Gordon Brown, to an untimely death in May 2018. Gord's passing deprived us of a wise and considered voice on issues of importance to Parliamentarians and Canadians. The implications of his absence grew more significant over the summer and fall as the Committee deliberated on its two major reviews. They grew acute with the resignation of the Honourable Tony Clement on November 7, depriving the Committee of any representation from the Official Opposition in the House of Commons. While the majority of the Committee's work was finished by early November, these episodes underlined the importance of quickly identifying replacements for NSICOP Members, whenever they leave and for whatever reason. It also caused the Committee to reconfirm its own discipline on appropriately handling sensitive and classified information and adhering to persona! security measures, including receiving additional briefings in November from security and intelligence officials in these areas.

Future work

267. In addition to the planned Special Report noted in the previous chapter, the Committee has already initiated its review work for its 2019 Annual Report. The Committee believes it is important to address a key gap in Canada's security and intelligence community by examining organizations not previously subject to review (i.e., outside of CSE, CSIS and the RCMP). Its 2018 review of the defence intelligence activities of DND/CAF was a first step. In 2019, the Committee will review the national security and intelligence activities of the CBSA. The Committee's review of CBSA will focus on understanding what role it plays in Canada's security and intelligence community, delineating its national security and intelligence activities from its broader responsibilities, and understanding how those activities work in practice. This review will continue to build a picture of the various parts of the security and intelligence community and how it works together, and to identify future areas for review.

268. The Committee also decided to review the issue of foreign interference. Canada's experience and that of our closest allies over the past several years shows that some states are taking increasingly. aggressive measures to influence our political processes and institutions, behaviour which poses a threat to our democratic values and security. As a pluralistic state composed of immigrant communities, Canada is not immune from these threats and must be particularly vigilant against efforts by foreign states to threaten or manipulate those communities for their own purposes. In 2019, the Committee will study the threat posed by foreign interference to Canada's security and the measures in place to counter it.

269. Inspired by the recent work of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee, the Committee has decided to look more closely at issues of diversity and inclusion in the security and intelligence community. These issues are important: Canada's population should see itself reflected in its public service. They are even more vital for security and intelligence organizations, which must ensure that their analysis and advice is informed by the broadest range of perspectives and experiences and to ensure that their investigations are conducted by people who understand the communities and people involved. Starting in 2019, the Committee will track how the security and intelligence community is doing in this area and engage officials from that community to identify best practices and areas where more could be done.

Conclusion

270. The Committee has an important mandate and responsibilities. Through the course of its work over the last year, the Committee sought to build its understanding of the security and intelligence community and to create productive relationships with the officials who lead it. The Committee is convinced that its reviews will, over time, strengthen the functioning and accountability of Canada's security and intelligence community and contribute to Canadians' knowledge of this important area of government.